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Optimal Competitive Auctions
Ning Chen∗ Nick Gravin† Pinyan Lu‡
Abstract
We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in unlimited supply (e.g.,
digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic problem stands out from profit-maximizing
auction design literature as it requires no probabilistic assumptions on buyers’ valuations and
employs the framework of competitive analysis. Our objective is to optimize the worst-case
performance of an auction, measured by the ratio between a given benchmark and revenue
generated by the auction.
We establish a sufficient and necessary condition that characterizes competitive ratios for all
monotone benchmarks. The characterization identifies the worst-case distribution of instances
and reveals intrinsic relations between competitive ratios and benchmarks in the competitive
analysis. With the characterization at hand, we show optimal competitive auctions for two
natural benchmarks.
The most well-studied benchmark F (2)(·) measures the envy-free optimal revenue where at
least two buyers win. Goldberg et al. [13] showed a sequence of lower bounds on the competitive
ratio for each number of buyers n. They conjectured that all these bounds are tight. We show
that optimal competitive auctions match these bounds. Thus, we confirm the conjecture and
settle a central open problem in the design of digital goods auctions. As one more application
we examine another economically meaningful benchmark, which measures the optimal revenue
across all limited-supply Vickrey auctions. We identify the optimal competitive ratios to be
( n
n−1 )
n−1 − 1 for each number of buyers n, that is e− 1 as n approaches infinity.
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1 Introduction
A central question in auction theory is to design optimal truthful auctions that maximize the
revenue of the auctioneer. A truthful auction must be incentive compatible with the selfish behavior
of bidders and encourage them to reveal their private information truthfully. In the classic single-
parameter setting, the auctioneer sells multiple copies of an item to n unit-demand bidders, each
bidder having a private value vi for the item. The revenue maximization problem in economics is
traditionally analyzed in the Bayesian framework. The seminal Myerson’s auction [23] provides an
optimal design that extracts the maximum expected revenue for a given distribution of values.
While Myerson’s auction gives an optimal design in the Bayesian framework, in many scenarios
determining or estimating the prior distribution in advance is impossible. Without prior information
on the distribution, how should an auction be designed? The auctioneer not being certain about
the prior distribution is likely to resort to truthful auctions that generate a good revenue on every
possible instance of bidders’ valuations. We therefore employ the worst-case competitive analysis,
which characterizes the worst-case performance of an auction across all possible bidders’ valuations.
We follow the framework summarized in [14] where a truthful auction is required to generate a
profit comparable to the value of a certain economically meaningful benchmark on every input of
values. The motivation of this framework comes from the analysis of on-line algorithms, where
the performance of an on-line algorithm, which is unaware of the future, is measured in terms of
the performance of the optimal off-line algorithm that knows the future. The assumption that
an on-line algorithm does not know the future in advance corresponds to the assumption that an
auction does not know the bidders valuations in advance. How well an auction can perform in the
worst-case? We will answer this question in the present paper.
A particularly interesting single-parameter setting is digital goods auctions in which the number
of units for sale is unlimited or is greater than or equal to the number of bidders. Digital goods
auctions are motivated by the applications of selling digital goods like downloadable software on the
Internet or pay-per-view television where there is a negligible cost for producing a copy of the item.
The design of the optimal Bayesian auction for digital goods is trivial: given a prior distribution of
values, one may independently offer each bidder a fixed price pi tailored to the value’s distribution
vi so as to maximize the expected revenue pi ·Pr[vi ≥ pi]. From the worst-case perspective, digital
goods auctions attracted considerable attention over the last decade [2, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 19, 21].
However, the optimal design was still unknown. The question about designing optimal digital
goods auctions remained widely open and is fundamental to our understanding of the optimal
competitive auction design in the general single-parameter setting.
Formally, in the competitive analysis framework, given a benchmark function f(·), the compet-
itive ratio (with respect to f(·)) of a truthful auction A is defined as maxv
f(v)
E[A(v)] , where E[A(v)]
is the expected revenue of the auction A on valuation vector v = (v1, . . . , vn). The objective is to
design an auction that minimizes the competitive ratio with respect to a given benchmark.
We note that a number of functions can serve as meaningful benchmarks and that they may have
different optimal competitive ratios. Such flexibility in the choice of a target benchmark function
may prove to be helpful for modeling different objectives of the auctioneer. Conversely, it may allow
us to make meaningful conclusions and prescriptions about target benchmarks. However, most of
the work done along the line of competitive analysis in algorithmic game theory [24] is devoted to
the competitive analysis of a well-motivated but fixed concrete benchmark function. Namely, while
there are basic guidelines for choosing a good benchmark function (e.g., the benchmark should
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have a strong economic motivation and should match the performance of the optimal auction as
closely as possible), there are no formal criteria for distinguishing different benchmarks. In this
paper, instead of justifying what a good benchmark is, we focus on the intrinsic relation between
benchmarks and their corresponding competitive ratios. We give a complete characterization for
almost all possible benchmark functions.
Theorem 1. (Characterization) For any non-negative and monotonically increasing function f(·),
there is a truthful digital goods auction that achieves a competitive ratio of λ with respect to f(·)
if and only if ∫
S
f(v) · w(v) dv ≤ λ ·
n∑
i=1
∫
S↓i
w(v-i) dv-i, (1)
where S is any upward closed set in the support of valuation vectors, S↓i is the projection of S
along the i-th coordinate, w(v) =
∏
i 1/v
2
i , and v-i = (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn).
The fact that the weight function w(v) =
∏
i 1/v
2
i appears in the above theorem is not a
coincidence. The corresponding single-parameter distribution with the density function w(vi) =
1/v2i for vi ∈ [1,∞) is a common tool to provide bounds on the performance of auctions. It is
called equal-revenue distribution, as it enjoys a remarkable property that if the value of a bidder i is
drawn from this distribution, then any fixed price pi offered to i generates the same expected revenue
pi · Pr[vi ≥ pi] = 1. In particular, the product w(v) of independent equal-revenue distributions
w(vi) was used in [13] to obtain the best known lower bounds on the competitive ratios of digital
goods auctions; it has also been used in the auction analysis of other models, e.g., in [17].
As we know from Yao’s minimax principle, for any benchmark function f(·), there is a dis-
tribution of instances such that on average for that distribution no truthful auction can beat the
worst-case competitive ratio with respect to f(·). The inequality (1) in the theorem states that the
equal revenue distribution is indeed the worst-case distribution to estimate the competitive ratio
of an auction. In other words, in the context of digital goods auctions, the worst-case distribution
can be described only by its support, and the actual density of the distribution is given by the
equal-revenue distribution. The theorem gives a sufficient and necessary condition for a benchmark
function f(·) to admit a competitive ratio of λ. It implies that the optimal competitive ratio with
respect to f(·) is the smallest value of λ for which the inequality (1) holds. The theorem indicates
that all benchmarks and their competitive ratios are tied to the equal revenue distribution: it is
the worst distribution not only for the benchmark considered in [13] but also for all monotone
benchmarks.
We note that our characterization is provided by the set of inequalities (1) that only involves
a function f(·) and a ratio λ, but does not describe an actual auction. This is similar in spirit to
the characterization of truthfully implementable allocation functions, where an allocation function
is truthfully implementable if there exists a payment function that makes the allocation function
truthful. To characterize a truthfully implementable allocation function, one uses a set of inequal-
ities such as weak-monotonicity [3,6,25] that only specifies an allocation function but says nothing
about payments. Hence, without describing any payment function, one can determine whether
there is a truthful auction with a specified allocation. Our characterization of benchmarks with a
given competitive ratio shares a similar philosophy: the condition determines whether there exists
a truthful auction with a certain completive ratio with respect to f(·), but does not explicitly
describe the auction.
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The characterization theorem provides us with a powerful tool to analyze the optimal competi-
tive ratios of auctions for different benchmarks. We first consider the most well-studied benchmark
F (2) introduced in [15], which is defined as the maximum revenue achieved in an envy-free allocation
provided that at least two bidders receive the item. We next study another natural benchmark,
denoted by maxV, which is defined as the maximal revenue of the k-item Vickrey auction across
all possible values of k. We have the following results on the optimal competitive ratios for these
two benchmarks.
Theorem 2. There are truthful digital goods auctions that achieve the optimal competitive ratios
of λn and γn for any n ≥ 2 with respect to the benchmarks F
(2) and maxV, respectively, where
λn = 1−
n∑
i=2
(
−1
n
)i−1 i
i− 1
(
n− 1
i− 1
)
and γn =
(
n
n− 1
)n−1
− 1.
It was shown in [13] that λn gives a lower bound on the competitive ratio of any auction with
respect to F (2) for any n ≥ 2. These lower bounds were obtained by calculating the expected value
of the benchmark F (2)(v) when v is drawn from the equal revenue distribution. In particular,
λ2 = 2, λ3 = 13/6, and in general, {λn}
∞
n=1 is an increasing sequence with a limit of roughly 2.42.
Goldberg et al. [13] conjectured that the lower bounds given by {λn} are tight. Indeed, for n = 2
bidders, the second price auction gives a matching competitive ratio of λ2; for n = 3 bidders, [19]
gave a sophisticated auction with a competitive ratio that matches the lower bound of λ3. These
are the only cases for which optimal competitive auctions were known. Our result confirms the
conjecture of [13] and settles the long standing open problem of designing optimal digital goods
auctions with respect to the benchmark F (2).
For the benchmark maxV, we calculate the expected value of maxV(v) when v is drawn from
the equal revenue distribution, and derive a sequence of optimal competitive ratios γn for each
number n of bidders in the auction. We note that γ2 = 1, γ3 = 5/4, and {γn}
∞
n=1 is an increasing
sequence with the limit of e− 1 as n approaches infinity.
Finally, as another application of the characterization theorem, we consider optimal competitive
auctions for the multi-unit limited supply setting where there is an item with k units of supply for
sale to n unit-demand bidders. It was observed in [14] that there is a competitive ratio preserving
reduction from unlimited supply to limited supply. Namely, given a digital goods auction with a
competitive ratio λ with respect to F (2) for k bidders, one can construct a truthful auction for
n bidders with the same competitive ratio λ with respect to F (2,k) (where F (2,k) is the optimal
fixed price revenue provided that at least 2 and at most k bidders receive the item). Our analysis
continues to hold for those benchmarks that only depend on the k highest values, and thus, gives
optimal competitive auctions in the competitive analysis framework.
1.1 Related Work
The study of competitive digital goods auctions was coined by Goldberg et al. [15], where the
authors introduced the random sampling optimal price auction and showed that it has a constant
competitive ratio with respect to F (2). Later on the competitive ratio of the auction was shown to
be 15 and 4.68, by Feige et al. [9] and Alaei et al. [2], respectively. Since the pioneer work of [15], a
sequence of work has been devoted to design auctions with improved competitive ratios: the random
sampling cost sharing auction [10] with ratio 4; the consensus revenue estimate auction [12] with
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ratio 3.39; the aggregation auction [19] with ratio 3.25; the best known ratio 3.12 is attained by
the averaging auction [21].
Fiat et al. [10] formulated the prior-free analysis framework for digital goods auctions. The
framework was further developed to general symmetric auction problems and connected with the
Bayesian framework in [20]. The relation between envy-freedom and prior-free mechanism design
was further investigated in [18]. Aggarwal et al. [1] showed that every randomized auction in the
digital goods environment can be derandomized in polynomial time with an extra additive error
that depends on the maximal range of values.
Leonardi and Roughgarden [26] introduced another benchmark, namely monotone-price bench-
markM(2). Later it was shown in [5] that digital goods auctions have a constant competitive ratio
with respect to M(2).
A number of variants of digital goods auctions have been investigated, including, e.g., online
auctions [4,7], limited supply (k-unit auctions) [8], online auctions with unknown limited supply [22],
externalities between bidders [16], and matroid permutations and position environments [18].
2 Preliminaries
In a digital goods auction, an auctioneer sells multiple copies of an item in unlimited supply to n
bidders. Each bidder i is interested in a single unit of the item and values it at a privately known
value vi. We consider a single-round auction, where each bidder submits a sealed bid bi to the
auctioneer. Upon receiving submitted bids b = (b1, . . . , bn) from all bidders, the auctioneer decides
on whether each bidder i receives an item and the amount that i pays. If bidder i wins an item,
his utility is the difference between his value vi and his payment; otherwise, the bidder pays 0 and
his utility is 0. The auctioneer’s revenue is the total payment of the bidders.
We assume that all bidders are self-motivated and aim to maximize their own utility. We say
that an auction is truthful or incentive compatible if it is a dominant strategy for every bidder i to
submit his private value, i.e., bi = vi, no matter how other bidders behave. A randomized auction
is (universally) truthful if it is randomly distributed over deterministic truthful auctions.
An auction is called bid-independent if, for each bidder i, the auctioneer computes a threshold
price pi according to the bids of the rest n− 1 bidders b-i = (b1, . . . , bi−1, ?, bi+1, . . . , bn). In other
words, there is a function gi such that pi = gi(b-i). It was shown in [15] that an auction is truthful
if and only if it is bid-independent. Thus, it is sufficient to consider bid-independent auctions in
order to design truthful auctions.
To evaluate the performance of an auction, we need to have a reasonable benchmark function
f : Rn → R, where f(b) measures our target revenue for the bid vector b. Given a benchmark
function f(·), we say that an auction A has a competitive ratio of λ with respect to f(·) if
f(v)
E[A(v)]
≤ λ, ∀v = (v1, . . . , vn)
where E[A(b)] is the expected revenue of auction A on the bid vector b. The focus of our paper is to
design truthful auctions that minimize the competitive ratio with respect to different benchmarks.
In this paper, we assume that a benchmark function f(·) is non-negative and monotone. These
are natural conditions for a function to serve as a reasonable benchmark. Specifically, we will focus
on the following benchmark functions. (Given a bid vector b = (b1, . . . , bn) we reorder bids so that
b(1) ≥ b(2) ≥ · · · ≥ b(n).)
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• F (2)(b) = max2≤k≤n k · b(k). That is, F
(2) gives the largest possible revenue obtained in a
fixed price auction given that there are at least two winners. F (2) was denoted sometimes
as F (2) in the previous literature and provides the optimal envy-free revenue conditioned on
that at least two bidders receive the item.
• maxV(b) = max1≤k<n k · b(k+1). We note that k · b(k+1) is the revenue of the k-item Vickrey
auction with a fixed supply of k items. Hence, maxV gives the largest revenue obtained in
the Vickrey auction for selling k items for all possible values of the limited supply k.
Theorem 1 (Goldberg et al. [13]). The competitive ratio with respect to F (2) of any truthful
randomized auction is at least
λn = 1−
n∑
i=2
(
−1
n
)i−1 i
i− 1
(
n− 1
i− 1
)
.
We note that λ2 = 2, λ3 = 13/6, and {λn}
∞
n=1 is an increasing sequence with a limit of 2.42
when n approaches infinity. In the proof of the above theorem, the authors of [13] constructed
a so-called equal revenue distribution where all values vi are drawn identically and independently
with probability Pr[vi > x] =
1
x
for any x ≥ 1. A remarkable property of this distribution is that
any truthful auction has the same expected revenue n. It was shown that the expected value of
F (2)(v) is n× λn. Thus, the theorem follows since
max
v
F (2)(v)
E[A(v)]
≥
E[F (2)(v)]
E[A(v)]
=
n× λn
n
= λn.
3 Characterization of Benchmarks
We introduce the following central definition for a Benchmark function.
Definition 1 (Attainability). A benchmark function f(·) is λ-attainable if there exists a truthful
auction that has a competitive ratio of λ with respect to f(·).
We shall give a sufficient and necessary condition of attainability of a benchmark in this section
with a set of inequalities which only involves the function f and ratio λ but not any auction. After
having the characterization, we analyze the attainability of two well-studied benchmarks in the
next section.
For technical simplicity, we consider a discrete and bounded domain for all bids: for any bidder
i, we assume that bi ∈
{
(1+ δ)t | t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N
}
, where δ > 0 is any fixed small constant. Thus,
all bids are between 1 and (1 + δ)N , and are multiples of 1 + δ. Let
Λ =
{
(1 + δ)t | t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N
}
denote the support of a single bidder’s bids and Λn denote the support of bid vectors of all n
bidders. We note that such a multiplicative discretization is not critical for our characterization.
(Alternatively, we may consider an additive discretization with bids being integer multiples of δ.)
We will discuss how to generalize our analysis to continuous and unbounded domains at the end of
this section.
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For the domain Λn we assume without loss of generality that for any b-i, the price offered to
bidder i is also from Λ, which is of the form (1 + δ)t. For b-i ∈ Λ
n−1 and pi ∈ Λ, let zi(b-i, pi)
denote the probability that the auctioneer offers price pi to bidder i when observing others’ bids
b-i. There exists a truthful auction that is λ-competitive with respect to the benchmark f(·) if and
only if the following linear system is feasible:
LS1 :


λ ·
∑
i
bi∑
pi=1
pi · zi(b-i, pi) ≥ f(b), ∀b
(1+δ)N∑
pi=1
zi(b-i, pi) ≤ 1, ∀i,b-i
zi(b-i, pi) ≥ 0, ∀i,b-i, pi
Note that the summation over pi in LS1 is taken in the domain Λ =
{
(1 + δ)t | t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N
}
.
We remark that the correspondence between {zi(b-i, pi)}i and truthful auctions is not one-to-
one but one-to-many. For any auction, there is a corresponding probability profile {zi(b-i, pi)}i
that satisfies LS1. On the other hand, different auctions may have the same probability profile
{zi(b-i, pi)}i (thus, they have the same expected revenue). Note that for any given {zi(b-i, pi)}i, we
can construct at least one corresponding truthful auction, which independently offers the threshold
price pi to each bidder i with probability zi(b-i, pi).
We define
xi(b) = xi(b-i, bi) =
bi∑
pi=1
pi · zi(b-i, pi).
Intuitively, xi(b) gives the expected revenue obtained from bidder i when the bid vector is b. We
further define
w
(
(1 + δ)t
)
=
{
δ
(1+δ)t+1
, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1
1
(1+δ)N
, t = N
We note that w(·) can be viewed as a equal revenue distribution over Λ, which satisfies the following
nice property:
N∑
t=k
w
(
(1 + δ)t
)
=
1
(1 + δ)k
.
Let w(b) =
∏n
k=1w(bk) and w(b-i) =
∏
k 6=iw(bk).
Given these definitions, the aforementioned linear system LS1 can be rewritten as follows.
LS2 :


λ ·
∑
i
xi(b-i, bi) ≥ f(b), ∀b
N∑
t=0
w
(
(1 + δ)t
)
· xi
(
b-i, (1 + δ)
t
)
≤ 1, ∀i,b-i
xi
(
b-i, (1 + δ)
t
)
≤ xi
(
b-i, (1 + δ)
t+1
)
, ∀i,b-i, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1
xi(b-i, bi) ≥ 0, ∀b
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The third constraint in LS2 requires monotonicity of xi(·), which is a necessary condition for the
equivalence of the two linear systems. Indeed, zi(b-i, bi) =
1
bi
(
xi(b-i, bi) − xi(b-i,
bi
1+δ )
)
must be
non-negative, where we denote xi(b-i,
1
1+δ ) = 0. To summarize, we have the following claim.
Proposition 2. A monotone function f is λ-attainable if and only if the linear system LS2 has a
feasible solution x = {xi(b)}i,b (or equivalently, LS1 has a feasible solution z = {zi(b)}i,b).
For any set S ⊆ Λn, let S↓i denote the projections of S along the i-th coordinate. Formally,
S↓i =
{
b-i | ∃bi s.t. (b-i, bi) ∈ S
}
.
For a non-negative and monotone function f , we have the following characterization.
Theorem 3. Over a domain Λ, a non-negative and monotone function f is λ-attainable if and
only if for any upward closed set S ⊂ Λn,∑
b∈S
w(b) · f(b) ≤ λ ·
∑
i
∑
b
-i∈S↓i
w(b
-i). (2)
Proof. Only if (necessity). If f(·) is λ-attainable, then there exists a solution xi(b-i, bi) which
satisfies all constraints in LS2. Thus,∑
b∈S
w(b) · f(b) ≤ λ ·
∑
b∈S
w(b)
∑
i
xi(b-i, bi)
= λ ·
∑
i
∑
b-i∈S↓i
w(b-i)
∑
bi:b∈S
w(bi) · xi(b-i, bi)
≤ λ ·
∑
i
∑
b-i∈S↓i
w(b-i)
∑
bi∈Λ
w(bi) · xi(b-i, bi)
≤ λ ·
∑
i
∑
b-i∈S↓i
w(b-i).
If (sufficiency). Our goal is to find a feasible solution x = {xi(b)}i,b to the above linear system
LS2, given the system of inequalities (2). Our proof is constructive: we provide a procedure of
continuously increasing {xi(b)}i,b, starting from 0, to a point where all constraints of LS2 are
satisfied. In order to do that, we write a slightly more general linear system of the following form.
LS3 :


λ ·
∑
i
xi(b-i, bi) ≥ f(b), ∀b
N∑
t=0
w
(
(1 + δ)t
)
· xi
(
b-i, (1 + δ)
t
)
≤ gi(b-i), ∀i,b-i
xi
(
b-i, (1 + δ)
t
)
≤ xi
(
b-i, (1 + δ)
t+1
)
, ∀i,b-i, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1
xi(b-i, bi) ≥ 0, ∀b
The only difference between LS2 and LS3 is gi(b-i) in the second constraint. Intuitively, gi(b-i)
represents a total mass along direction i at the point b-i. Initially, gi(b-i) = 1, for all i and b-i,
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and in which case, the two linear systems LS2 and LS3 are identical. We will however decrease
the values of gi(b-i)’s in the process of the proof while maintaining the following condition, derived
from (2), for all upward closed sets S ⊂ Λn.∑
b∈S
w(b) · f(b) ≤ λ ·
∑
i
∑
b-i∈S↓i
gi(b-i)w(b-i). (3)
Let Γ be the collection of upward closed sets for which the above inequality (3) is tight. It turns
out that Γ has a nice structure summarized in the following claim.
Claim 4. If S1, S2 ∈ Γ, then S1 ∪ S2, S1 ∩ S2 ∈ Γ.
Proof. We note that both S1 and S2 are upward closed sets, then so are S1 ∪ S2 and S1 ∩ S2. This
implies that ∑
b∈S1∪S2
w(b) · f(b) ≤ λ ·
∑
i
∑
b-i∈(S1∪S2)↓i
gi(b-i) · w(b-i) (4)
∑
b∈S1∩S2
w(b) · f(b) ≤ λ ·
∑
i
∑
b-i∈(S1∩S2)↓i
gi(b-i) · w(b-i) (5)
As both S1, S2 ∈ Γ, we have∑
b∈S1
w(b) · f(b) = λ ·
∑
i
∑
b-i∈S1↓i
gi(b-i) · w(b-i)
∑
b∈S2
w(b) · f(b) = λ ·
∑
i
∑
b-i∈S2↓i
gi(b-i) · w(b-i)
For each b-i, if b-i is a projection of some b ∈ S1 ∪ S2, then either b-i ∈ S1↓i or b-i ∈ S2↓i; if b-i is
a projection of some b ∈ S1 ∩ S2, then b-i ∈ S1↓i and b-i ∈ S2↓i. Hence,∑
b∈S1∪S2
w(b) · f(b) +
∑
b∈S1∩S2
w(b) · f(b)
=
∑
b∈S1
w(b) · f(b) +
∑
b∈S2
w(b) · f(b)
= λ ·
∑
i

 ∑
b-i∈S1↓i
gi(b-i) · w(b-i) +
∑
b-i∈S2↓i
gi(b-i) · w(b-i)


≥ λ ·
∑
i

 ∑
b-i∈(S1∪S2)↓i
gi(b-i) · w(b-i) + λ ·
∑
b-i∈(S1∩S2)↓i
gi(b-i) · w(b-i)


Therefore, both inequalities (4) and (5) are tight. Thus, S1 ∩ S2, S1 ∪ S2 ∈ Γ.
The high-level idea of our proof is to continuously increase {xi(b)}i,b, starting from 0, to a
point where all constraints of LS2 are satisfied. To implement the idea, we identify two special sets
S0 and S1, where S0 ) S1, and a special set Ti ⊆ S0↓i \ S1↓i for a specific coordinate i. Then for
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each b-i ∈ Ti, we find a threshold point ci(b-i) and increase xi(b-i, b) by ε for all b ≥ ci(b-i). (In the
proof, ci(b-i) turns out to be the boundary of S0.) However, in the process, instead of increasing
xi’s, we decrease the values of f(·) and gi(·) to simplify our analysis (thus, the values of xi’s do
not change): For each b-i ∈ Ti, we decrease f(b-i, b) by λ · ε for b ≥ ci(b-i) to have an equivalent
effect on the first constraint of LS3; further, we subtract
ε
ci(b-i)
from gi(b-i) to balance the update
of xi’s in the second constraint of LS3. The process continues until all f(·)’s become 0, from which
point we get an equivalent solution {xi(b)}i,b to the original problem. We next describe the formal
proof.
Let R = {b | f(b) > 0} be the support of f(·). Since f(·) is a monotone function, we know
that R is an upward closed set. If R = ∅, then we are done; thus, we assume that R 6= ∅. For any
S ∈ Γ, the following chain of inequalities∑
b∈S
w(b) · f(b) =
∑
b∈S∩R
w(b) · f(b) ≤ λ ·
∑
i
∑
b-i∈(S∩R)↓i
w(b-i) ≤ λ ·
∑
i
∑
b-i∈S↓i
w(b-i)
is in fact an equality. Hence, the above two inequalities are tight and S ∩ R ∈ Γ. Hence, in the
following, we will only consider those tight sets in Γ that are contained in R.
Let S0 = R. We will maintain a chain of upward closed sets S1, . . . , Sm ∈ Γ with the following
structure:
R = S0 ) S1 ) S2 ) · · · ) Sm = ∅.
During our process, we preserve the following key properties (†):
Invariant properties (†)
1. Inequality (3) holds for all upward closed sets.
2. All sets S1, . . . , Sm in the chain R = S0 ) S1 ) S2 ) · · · ) Sm = ∅ remain tight.
3. f(·) is nonnegative and monotonically increasing.
4. gi(b-i) is nonnegative and monotonically decreasing on (Sj−1)↓i \ Sj↓i for every
1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
We note that all these properties hold at the beginning of the process (e.g., we may simply
choose m = 1 and Sm = ∅). Since R ) S1, we have∑
b∈R
w(b) · f(b) >
∑
b∈S1
w(b) · f(b).
Since R satisfies condition (3) and S1 ∈ Γ, we have∑
b∈R
w(b) · f(b) ≤ λ ·
∑
i
∑
b-i∈R↓i
gi(b-i) · w(b-i)
∑
b∈S1
w(b) · f(b) = λ ·
∑
i
∑
b-i∈S1↓i
gi(b-i) · w(b-i).
Hence, ∑
i
∑
b-i∈R↓i
gi(b-i) · w(b-i) >
∑
i
∑
b-i∈S1↓i
gi(b-i) · w(b-i). (6)
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Thus, we can find i and b-i such that b-i ∈ R↓i \ S1↓i and gi(b-i) > 0. From now on to the end of
the proof, for notational simplicity we use i to denote this particular index rather than a generic
one. Let Ti =
{
b-i ∈ R↓i \ S1↓i | gi(b-i) > 0
}
; note that Ti 6= ∅.
For each b-i ∈ Ti we consider the smallest ci(b-i) ∈ Λ such that f(b-i, ci(b-i)) 6= 0. We note that
ci(b-i) is well defined for each b-i ∈ Ti since Ti ⊂ R↓i. For the fixed index i, we intend to update x
as follows:
xi(b-i, b)← xi(b-i, b) + ε, for all b-i ∈ Ti and b ≥ ci(b-i),
for some fixed ε > 0. In our process, instead of increasing x we decrease the values of f(·) and gi(·)
as follows:
(♦)


f(b-i, b)← f(b-i, b)− λ · ε, for all b-i ∈ Ti and b ≥ ci(b-i),
gi(b-i)← gi(b-i)−
ε
ci(b-i)
, for all b-i ∈ Ti.
The decrements are with respect to the fixed index i only1 and are implemented by continuously
increasing ε from 0 until the value of one of f(b) and gi(b-i) drops down to 0, or one more inequality
(3) becomes tight for a new upward closed set.
Before describing how to proceed with the process, we establish some observations for the above
updates (♦).
Claim 5. For any ε and upward closed set S ⊆ S1, the two sides of the inequality (3) for S
remain unchanged. In particular, the inequality is still tight for all sets S1, . . . , Sm in the chain
R = S0 ) S1 ) S2 ) · · · ) Sm = ∅.
Proof. The claim follows trivially since for any S ⊆ S1, none of f(b) and gi(b-i) changes for every
b ∈ S and b-i ∈ S↓i.
Claim 6. For any upward closed set S ⊃ R \ S1 and ε, the condition (3) is still satisfied.
Proof. For the considered set S, the changes of the left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand side (RHS)
of (3) are as follows.
LHS ← LHS− ελ ·
∑
b-i∈Ti
w(b-i) ·
(1+δ)N∑
bi=ci(b-i)
w(bi) = LHS− ελ ·
∑
b-i∈Ti
w(b-i) ·
1
ci(b-i)
RHS ← RHS− λ ·
∑
b-i∈Ti
w(b-i) ·
ε
ci(b-i)
Hence, two sides of (3) decrease by exactly the same amount. Therefore, inequality (3) remains
true for S.
Claim 7. The function f(·) remains monotonically increasing.
Proof. Let us assume to the contrary that f(·) becomes non-monotone after one update. We note
that all the four key properties (†) hold before the update. Then there must exist a pair of vectors
d ≺ b such that 0 ≤ f(b) < f(d) after the update. We have the following observations, where all
variables denote their values before the update.
1Because the process updates values only for one dimension at one step, the auction generated by our approach
may not be symmetric. See the example in the next section.
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• Every value of f(·) either remains the same or decreases by λ · ε. Thus, f(b) decreases and
f(d) remains the same.
• b-i ∈ Ti, since f(b) must decrease. Thus, gi(b-i) > 0.
• d ∈ R = S0, as f(d) > 0.
• d-i /∈ Ti (otherwise, we would decrease f(d) by λ · ε, since f(d) > 0).
• d-i ∈ S0↓i \ S1↓i, since d-i ≺ b-i /∈ S1↓i.
• gi(d-i) = 0, as d-i /∈ Ti.
• gi(b-i) ≤ gi(d-i), as d-i ≺ b-i and gi(·) is decreasing on S0↓i \ S1↓i.
Therefore, we obtain that gi(b-i) ≤ gi(d-i) = 0 and b-i /∈ Ti, a contradiction.
Claim 8. The function gi(·) remains monotonically decreasing on (Sj−1)↓i \ Sj↓i for each set Sj
in the chain R = S0 ) S1 ) S2 ) · · · ) Sm = ∅.
Proof. We note that gi(·) does not change on (Sj−1)↓i \ Sj↓i for every j > 1. Thus, we only need
to verify the claim for S0↓i \ S1↓i. Assume to the contrary that there exists a pair of vectors
d-i,h-i ∈ S0↓i \ S1↓i such that d-i ≺ h-i and 0 ≤ gi(d-i) < gi(h-i) after the update. We have the
following observations.
• gi(d-i) must decrease.
• d-i ∈ Ti.
• There exists d = (d-i, d) ∈ R, since d-i ∈ Ti.
• Let h = (h-i, d), then h ∈ R, as d ≺ h and R is upward closed.
• h-i ∈ Ti since gi(h-i) > 0.
We note that for each b-i ∈ Ti, the value of gi(b-i) decreases by
ε
ci(b-i)
. Since f(·) is monotonically
increasing and ci(b-i) is the smallest number such that f(b-i, ci(b-i)) > 0, we have ci(h-i) ≤ ci(d-i).
Therefore, the decrement of gi(h-i), which is
ε
ci(h-i)
, is not smaller than the decrement of gi(d-i),
which is ε
ci(d-i)
. Since before the decrement we have gi(d-i) ≥ gi(h-i), we derive a contradiction.
Combining Claim 5, 6, 7 and 8 together, we conclude that after update (♦) the aforementioned
four key properties (†) still hold. Thus, we continuously increase ε until a threshold point when
one of the three boundary conditions (i.e., f(·) = 0, gi(·) = 0, or inequality (3) becomes tight for
a new set) becomes tight, which forbids us from further increasing ε. If more than one conditions
become tight simultaneously, we consider them according to the following order.
• At a new point f(·) becomes 0. We then redefine set R = {b | f(b) > 0}. Note that by
Claim 7, R remains to be an upward closed set. Further, we let Si ← Si∩R for all sets in the
chain R = S0 ) S1 ) S2 ) · · · ) Sm = ∅. (If some of the sets become the same, we contract
the chain into a shorter one. With respect to this refined chain, gi(·) is still monotonically
decreasing on each (Sj−1)↓i \ Sj↓i.) Then we start over the whole process unless R = ∅, in
which case the process terminates.
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• At a new point gi(·) becomes 0. We start over by finding a new index i and set Ti for inequality
(6). (The set R and the chain remain the same.)
• There is a new upward closed set, say S′ ⊂ Λn, for which inequality (3) becomes tight.
Similarly, we assume without loss of generality that S′ ⊂ R. First, S′ cannot contain R \ S1
due to Claim 6. Second, S1 cannot contain S
′ due to Claim 5. By Claim 4, we know that
S∗ , S′ ∪ S1 is also an upward closed tight set. We observe that S
∗ = S′ ∪ S1 ) S1 and
R = S0 ) S
∗. Thus, we can plug S∗ into the sequence
R = S0 ) S
∗ ) S1 ) S2 ) · · · ) Sm = ∅.
Since gi(·) is a monotonically decreasing function on set S1↓i \ S0↓i, it is a monotonically
decreasing function on both S1↓i \S
∗
↓i
and S∗↓i \S0↓i. All the inequalities (3) and conditions
in (♦) continue to hold with respect to this new chain; hence, we can start over the whole
process.
In each step of the update, we either increase the length of the tight set chain or decrease the
support of f(·) or gi(·). Thus, the process will eventually terminate as there are only finitely many
b ∈ Λn and finitely many upward closed sets. We note that if there is b ∈ Λn with f(b) 6= 0, then
not all gi(·)’s can become 0, because otherwise (3) would be violated for S = Λ
n. Therefore, the
process must terminate when f(b) = 0 for every b ∈ Λn.
Therefore, the respective sequence of updates of {xi(b)}i,b is a feasible solution to LS2. Indeed,
we have checked that the first and second constraints in LS2 are satisfied. The third and forth
constraints hold true, because in every update (♦) we may only increase xi(b), and for each fixed
b-i we increase xi(b-i, b) monotonically in b. Hence, the benchmark function f(·) is attainable.
We further have the following claim, which will be used in the next section to prove that F (2)
is attainable.
Claim 9. If f(·) is a symmetric monotone function (i.e., f(b) is invariant under permutations of
coordinates in b), then it is sufficient to verify inequality (2) only for all symmetric upward closed
sets for f(·) to be attainable.
Proof. Assume that there is an upward closed set that violates (2). Then we can continuously
decrease f(·) in an arbitrary way so that it remains monotone and symmetric; the process continues
until the moment when (2) holds for all upward closed sets. Let f ′ denote the resulting final function;
note that f ′ is attainable. Let S 6= ∅ be an upward closed set that (i) is tight for f ′ and (ii) violates
inequality (2) for f . We note that such a set S must exist. We then consider upward closed sets
S1, . . . , Sn! obtained from S by permuting coordinates of every b ∈ S (in a consistent way). Since
f and f ′ are symmetric functions, S1, . . . , Sn! share properties (i) and (ii) with S.
Applying Claim 4 to function f ′ and tight sets S1, . . . , Sn!, we obtain that S1 ∪ · · · ∪Sn! is tight
for f ′. Furthermore, by the definition of S, there is b ∈ S such that f(b) > f ′(b). We conclude
that S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sn! violates (2) for f . Hence, if f(·) is not attainable, then we can find a symmetric
upward closed set that violates condition (2).
3.1 Unbounded and Continuous Domains
Our above analysis works for the discrete and bounded domain where all bids are in the set Λ ={
(1 + δ)t | t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N
}
. Our analysis continues to hold when N =∞. Indeed, the argument
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for the necessity part of Theorem 3 for N = ∞ works in exactly the same way as the finite and
bounded case. For the sufficiency part, we apply a standard argument from measure theory and
mathematical analysis as follows.
For the unbounded domain, if inequality (2) in the characterization theorem holds true for all
upward closed sets, then every finite version of LS2 must have a feasible solution xN for every finite
size N of the support Λ(N) = {1, 1 + δ, . . . , (1 + δ)N}, where all outside densities are accumulated
at the boundary of Λ(N). We consider a corresponding feasible solution z
N
= {zi(b)}i,b to LS1
for each Λ(N). We treat the price distribution zi(b-i) for each bidder i as a measure defined on
the σ-algebra generated by the sets {[1, 1 + δ), . . . , [(1 + δ)N ,∞)}n. Every solution z
N
to LS1 is
a vector of n measures zi(b), of which we altogether further regard as a measure defined on the
σ-algebra σN generated by the sets {[1, 1+ δ), . . . , [(1+ δ)
N ,∞)}n×n. In a few steps below we show
how to construct a measure z∗ that generates a feasible solution of LS1 on every σ-algebra σN for
every N .
1. We notice that for any N2 > N1, every solution zN2 to LS1 for N2 is also a solution of LS1 for
N1. Indeed, as a solution of LS1 for N1 we may just use the same measure zN2 on a smaller
σ-algebra σN1 .
2. We observe that the set of all feasible solutions zN to LS1 for any fixed N is a compact
set (bounded and closed). We recall that one of the definitions of a compact set says that
every infinite sequence z
N
(N = 1, 2, . . .) of points in a compact C must contain an infinite
subsequence z
N(j)
(j = 1, 2, . . .) that converges to a point z
N
∈ C.
3. For every fixed N = ℓ, we consider a sequence of solutions zk to LS1 for each k = ℓ, ℓ+1, . . . .
For each zk we get a feasible solution zk|ℓ to LS1 for N = ℓ. Further, since the set of the
solutions to LS1 for N = ℓ is a compact set, we may choose an infinite subsequence that
converges to zℓ.
4. We note that by our construction, the measure zℓ can be extended to a feasible solution of
LS1 for every k ≥ ℓ, i.e., we can find a feasible solution zˆk to LS1 for N = k such that as a
measure zℓ = zˆk|ℓ. Indeed, we can take the infinite sequence {N(j)} for which zN(j) |ℓ → zℓ
and consider another infinite sequence of measures z
N(j)
|k. Within the latter sequence we can
choose an infinite subsequence converging to a feasible solution zˆk of LS1 for N = k (note
that zˆk|ℓ = zℓ).
5. In fact, when constructing each zℓ we can ensure that zℓ|j = zj for every j ≤ ℓ.
6. Finally, we may define our measure z∗ on the unbounded domain Λ as a limit of zℓ, where
ℓ→∞.
In a similar way by taking δ → 0, we can extend Theorem 3 to the case of continuous support.
Hence, in the continuous and unbounded domain, the sufficient and necessary condition (2) in
Theorem 3 translates into the following.
Theorem 10. A monotone function f(·) is λ-attainable if and only if for any measurable upward
closed set S ⊂ Rn≥1 ∫
S
f(b) · w(b) db ≤ λ ·
n∑
i=1
∫
S↓i
w(b
-i) db-i, (7)
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where
w(t) =
1
t2
, w(b) =
n∏
k=1
w(bk), w(b-i) =
∏
k 6=i
w(bk).
4 A Simple Example
We illustrate in this section how our process in the proof of Theorem 3 works on a simple example.
We take n = 2, support Λ = {1, 2}, and consider the following benchmark:
f(b1, b2) =
{
1.5 min(b1, b2) < 2
3.5 otherwise
Note that for this specific benchmark, the optimal competitive ratio λ is 1 for which the condition
(2) holds for all upward closed sets.
To simplify the presentation, we use the following tables to denote the values of x1(b1, b2),
x2(b1, b2), f(b1, b2), g1(b-1) and g2(b-2), respectively.
x1(1, 2) x1(2, 2)
x1(1, 1) x1(2, 1)
x2(1, 2) x2(2, 2)
x2(1, 1) x2(2, 1)
f(1, 2) f(2, 2)
f(1, 1) f(2, 1)
g1(2)
✏
✏
✏
✏
✏
✏
✏
✏
g1(1)
g2(1) g2(2)
We write LS3 for our specific support Λ as follows.
LS3 :


x1(b) + x2(b) ≥ f(b), ∀b
w(1) · xi(b-i, 1) + w(2) · xi(b-i, 2) ≤ gi(b-i), ∀i,b-i
xi(b-i, 1) ≤ xi(b-i, 2), ∀i,b-i
xi(b) ≥ 0. ∀i,b,
where w(2) = 12 and w(1) = 1− w(2) =
1
2 .
The initial values of the tables are as follows (we record xi’s so that we can reconstruct the
mechanism).
x1
0 0
0 0
x2
0 0
0 0
f
1.5 3.5
1.5 1.5
1
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟✟1
1 1
We begin our process with the trivial chain {1, 2}⊗2 = R = S0 ) S1 = ∅. We choose i = 1,
then according to our construction, Ti = {1, 2} and ci(b-i) = 1 for each b-i ∈ Ti. We continuously
increase ε up to 0.5 until two new sets {(2, 1), (2, 2)} and {(2, 2)} become tight simultaneously.
After the update, we get the following tables.
x1
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
x2
0 0
0 0
f
1 3
1 1
0.5
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟✟0.5
1 1
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We add these two new sets to our chain so that now it looks as {1, 2}⊗2 = R = S0 ) S1 )
S2 ) S3 = ∅, where S1 = {(2, 1), (2, 2)} and S2 = {(2, 2)}. Now since R↓1 \ S1↓1 is an empty set,
we must choose i = 2; thus, Ti = {1} and ci(b-i) = 1. We continuously increase ε up to 1 until all
f(1, 1), f(1, 2), g2(1) simultaneously become zero. We get the following tables after the update.
x1
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
x2
1 0
1 0
f
0 3
0 1
0.5
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟✟0.5
0 1
We update the chain so that {(2, 1), (2, 2)} = R = S0 ) S1 ) S2 = ∅, where S1 = {(2, 2)}.
(The chain becomes shorter, because R has decreased.) We choose i = 1, and get Ti = {1} and
ci(b-i) = 2 for b-1 = 1. We continuously increase ε to 1 until both f(2, 1) and g1(1) become zero
simultaneously. After the update, we have
x1
0.5 0.5
0.5 1.5
x2
1 0
1 0
f
0 3
0 0
0.5
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟✟0
0 1
We update the chain so that {(2, 2)} = R = S0 ) S1 = ∅. We choose i = 1, and get b-i = 2
and ci(b-i) = 2. We continuously increase ε up to 1 until g1(2) becomes zero. Now we have
x1
0.5 1.5
0.5 1.5
x2
1 0
1 0
f
0 2
0 0
0
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟✟0
0 1
The chain {(2, 2)} = R = S0 ) S1 = ∅ remains the same. Finally, we take i = 2, and get
b-i = 2 and ci(b-i) = 2. We continuously increase ε up to 2 until f(2, 2) and g2(2) become zero
simultaneously. The final tables are the following.
x1
0.5 1.5
0.5 1.5
x2
1 2
1 0
f
0 0
0 0
0
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟✟0
0 0
Hence, we found a feasible solution x = {xi(b)}i,b to LS2. The respective solution z = {zi(b)}i,b
to LS1 looks as follows.
z1
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
z2
0 1
1 0
In terms of the language of an auction, this reads that the auctioneer offers a random price of 1 or
2 to the first bidder and a price that is equal to b1 to the second bidder. We note that the resulting
auction is not unique due to multiple choices of the coordinate i at every step of our process. It is
interesting to notice that we get an asymmetric mechanism although the benchmark is symmetric.
5 F (2) is Attainable
We show in this section that F (2) is λn-attainable, for λn being the number conjectured in [14].
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Theorem 11. F (2)(·) is λn-attainable for any n ≥ 2, where
λn = 1−
n∑
i=2
(
−1
n
)i−1 i
i− 1
(
n− 1
i− 1
)
.
For the sake of notational convenience, we employ Fn(b) to denote F
(2)(b) when the input
vector b contains n bids. We let Λ = [1,+∞) and Λn = Rn≥1 denote the support of bid vectors.
Our proof is by induction on n. The base case n = 2 is trivial (where λ2 = 2 and F2(·) is 2-
attainable given by the Vickrey auction). We assume that for all k ≤ n, each Fk(·) is λk-attainable.
In the rest of this section, we show that Fn+1(·) is λn+1-attainable.
For the equal revenue distribution with density w(·), it was shown in [13] that
Eb∼w
[
Fk(b)
]
=
∫
Λk
Fk(b) · w(b) db = λk · k. (8)
We note that 1 =
∫∞
1 w(t) dt and, therefore, we have∫
Λk
Fk(b) · w(b) db = λk ·
k∑
i=1
∫
Λk−1
w(b-i) db-i. (9)
Comparing to the inequality (7) in Theorem 10, we have the following claim.
Claim 12. For k = 2, . . . , n, each λk is chosen so that inequality (7) is tight for the set Λ
k.
Let
Gn(z) = Fn+1(1, z), ∀z ∈ Λ
n.
By the following claim, to prove that Fn+1(b) with b ∈ Λ
n+1 is λn+1-attainable, it suffices to show
that Gn(z) with z ∈ Λ
n is λn+1-attainable.
Claim 13. If Gn(z) with z ∈ Λ
n is λn+1-attainable, then Fn+1(b) with b ∈ Λ
n+1 is λn+1-attainable.
Proof. To prove the claim, we convert a λn+1-competitive auction A for Gn(z) to one for Fn+1(b).
For each bidder i and b ∈ Λn+1, we may find a coordinate i∗ 6= i with the smallest bid bi∗ =
minj 6=i{bj}. If the minimum is not unique, we take i
∗ with largest index. Our auction for Fn+1(b)
offers price pi ·bi∗ to bidder i when observing b-i, where pi is the price offered to i in auction A when
observing bids
b(−i,−i∗)
bi∗
(b(−i,−i∗) is the bid vector of length n − 1 obtained from b by removing i
and i∗). We shall prove that this auction has expected revenue of at least Fn+1(b)
λn+1
.
First, we notice that Fk(b) scales linearly with b, i.e., Fk(t ·b) = t ·Fk(b) for any t ∈ R. Let j
∗
be the coordinate with the smallest bid bj∗ = min1≤j≤n+1{bj}. We take j
∗ with the largest index
if the minimum is not unique. Then for any bidder i 6= j∗, i∗ = j∗ in the above construction. We
will prove that the expected revenue from all bidders except j∗ is at least Fn+1(b)
λn+1
. The expected
revenue from all bidders except j∗ in our auction for Fn+1(b) is exactly bj∗ times the expected
revenue of A on the bid vector
b−j∗
bj∗
. The claim follows from the following relation between Gn(z)
and Fn+1(b)
Fn+1(b) = bj∗ · Fn+1
(
1,
b−j∗
bj∗
)
= bj∗ ·Gn
(
b−j∗
bj∗
)
.
16
We now show that Gn(z) behaves similarly as Fn+1(b) in (8).
Claim 14. The set Λn is tight for the benchmark Gn(z) and competitive ratio λn+1 in (2), i.e.,∫
Λn
Gn(z) · w(z) dz = λn+1 · n.
Proof. Given the equation (8), we know that
λn+1 · (n+ 1) =
∫
Λn+1
Fn+1(b)w(b) db =
n+1∑
i=1
∞∫
1
w(bi)
∫
bi·Λn
Fn+1(b)w(b-i) db-i dbi.
The last equality holds true because Λn+1 can be divided into n + 1 disjoint sets, where the i-th
set contains those b’s with the smallest coordinate bi and b-i ∈ bi · Λ
n. We further write
λn+1 · (n+ 1) = (n+ 1) ·
∞∫
1
w(t)
∫
t·Λn
Fn+1(t,b-(n+1))w(b-(n+1)) db-(n+1) dt.
Recall that w(t) = 1
t2
and w(b) =
∏
iw(bi). To simplify notation in the next expression, we let
x = b-(n+1) and z =
1
t
· x.
λn+1 =
∞∫
1
w(t)
∫
t·Λn
Fn+1(t,x)w(x) dxdt
=
∞∫
1
t−2
∫
Λn
t · Fn+1(1, z) · t
−2nw(z) · tn dzdt
=
∞∫
1
t−(n+1) dt
∫
Λn
Fn+1(1, z) · w(z) dz
=
1
n
·
∫
Λn
Gn(z) · w(z) dz.
Thus, the claim follows.
Let
Hn(z) = max
(
0, n + 1− Fn(z)
)
, ∀z ∈ Λn.
We observe that Gn(z) = Fn+1(1, z) = max(n+1, Fn(z)) for z ∈ Λ
n; thus, Gn(z) = Fn(z)+Hn(z).
We note that due to the induction hypothesis, Fn(z) is λn-attainable. This means that for every
symmetric upward closed set S ⊂ Λn, we have
∫
S
Fn(z) · w(z) dz ≤ λn ·
n∑
i=1
∫
S↓i
w(z-i) dz-i.
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We show in Claim 15 below that for every symmetric upward closed set S ⊂ Λn,
∫
S
Hn(z) · w(z) dz ≤ (λn+1 − λn) ·
n∑
i=1
∫
S↓i
w(z-i) dz-i.
If we combine the above two inequalities, then we get for every symmetric upward closed set S ⊂ Λn,
∫
S
Gn(z) · w(z) dz ≤ λn+1 ·
n∑
i=1
∫
S↓i
w(z-i) dz-i.
We observe that Fn(·), Gn(·) and Hn(·) all are symmetric functions. By Theorem 9, we know that
Gn(z) is λn+1-attainable. Hence, we are only left to prove the following Claim 15 in order to show
λn+1-attainability of Fn+1(b) and complete the proof of Theorem 11.
Claim 15. For every symmetric upward closed set S ⊂ Λn,
∫
S
Hn(z) · w(z) dz ≤ (λn+1 − λn) ·
n∑
i=1
∫
S↓i
w(z
-i) dz-i. (10)
Proof. Since S is a symmetric set, all projections S↓i are in fact equal to the same set, denoted
by X ⊂ Λn−1. We notice that S can be divided into n (almost) disjoint sets S = S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sn,
where each Si =
{
(z-i, zi) | z-i ∈ X, zi ≥ max(z-i)
}
and max(z-i) denotes the largest value of all
coordinates of z-i. Furthermore, note that for any zi ∈ [max(z-i),∞), the value of the benchmark
Fn(z-i, zi) is fixed; thus, the value of Hn(z-i, zi) is also fixed. Hence, we have the following equalities.∫
S
Hn(z) · w(z) dz =
n∑
i=1
∫
Si
Hn(z) · w(z) dz
= n ·
∫
X
w(z-n)
∞∫
max(z-n)
Hn(z-n, t) · w(t) dt dz-n
= n ·
∫
X
Hn(z-n,max(z-n))
max(z-n)
w(z-n) dz-n. (11)
By Claim 14, we know that
∫
Λn
Gn(z) · w(z) dz = λn+1 · n = λn+1 ·
n∑
i=1
∫
Λn−1
w(z-i) dz-i.
Further, equality (9) says
∫
Λn
Fn(z) · w(z) dz = λn ·
n∑
i=1
∫
Λn−1
w(z-i) dz-i.
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Thus,
∫
Λn
Hn(z) · w(z) dz =
∫
Λn
(
Gn(z)− Fn(z)
)
· w(z) dz = (λn+1 − λn) ·
n∑
i=1
∫
Λn−1
w(z-i) dz-i.
That is, Λn is a tight set for (10). This implies that
(λn+1 − λn) · n = (λn+1 − λn) ·
n∑
i=1
∫
Λn−1
w(z-i) dz-i =
∫
Λn
Hn(z) · w(z) dz
= n ·
∫
Λn−1
Hn(z-n,max(z-n))
max(z-n)
w(z-n) dz-n (12)
Therefore,
(λn+1 − λn) ·
n∑
i=1
∫
S↓i
w(z-i) dz-i = (λn+1 − λn) · n ·
∫
X
w(z-n) dz-n (13)
= n ·
∫
Λn−1
Hn(z-n,max(z-n))
max(z-n)
w(z-n) dz-n ·
∫
X
w(z-n) dz-n
Combining (11) and (13), we are left to show that∫
X
Hn(z-n,max(z-n))
max(z-n)
w(z-n) dz-n ≤
∫
Λn−1
Hn(z-n,max(z-n))
max(z-n)
w(z-n) dz-n ·
∫
X
w(z-n) dz-n (14)
SinceHn(z) is a non-negative monotonically decreasing function, the functionH
′(z-n) ,
Hn(z-n,max(z-n))
max(z-n)
is also non-negative monotonically decreasing. Let 1X(z-n) denote the characteristic function of
the set X. Note that 1X(·) is a non-negative monotonically increasing function. Now the inequality
(14) simply reads as∫
Λn−1
H ′(z-n) · 1X(z-n) · w(z-n) dz-n ≤
∫
Λn−1
H ′(z-n) · w(z-n) dz-n ·
∫
Λn−1
1X(z-n) · w(z-n) dz-n.
The last inequality for an arbitrary non-negative monotonically increasing function (in our case
it is 1X(·)), an arbitrary non-negative monotonically decreasing function (in our case it is H
′(·)),
and an arbitrary product measure (in our case it is w(z-i)) is known as a special case of Fortuin-
Kasteleyn-Ginibre (FKG) inequality [11] (in the uni-variate case this inequality is called Chebyshev
Integral inequality). Therefore, the inequality holds and the claim follows.
6 k-Item Vickrey Auction
In this section, we consider the benchmark maxV(b) = max1≤k<n k · bk+1 provided by the largest
revenue of the k-item Vickrey auction across all possible values of supply k.
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First of all, we calculate the lower bound on the competitive ratio for maxV(·) using similar
approach as in [13]. We employ equal revenue distribution B of bid vectors, that is i.i.d. with the
density function w(b) = 1
b2
, cumulative density 1 − 1
b
, and the support [1,∞). The key technical
problem is to compute the expected value of the benchmark maxV(B). Following [13], we compute
the probability Pr[maxV(B) ≥ z] for any given z. Since maxV(B) is at least n− 1, we only need
to compute the probability for z ≥ n − 1. Let a random variable Vi be the i-th largest bid in B.
We further define a set of random variables as
Fn,k = max
i=1,2,...,n
(k + i− 1) · Vi.
We note that so far we follow the idea of [13], but adjust definitions accordingly to the benchmark
maxV(·). Intuitively, Fn,k captures the value of maxV(·) given k additional bidders with bid V1.
Let Hi denote the event
Vi ≥
z
k + i− 1
and
∧
j=i+1,i+2,...,n
Vj <
z
k + j − 1
.
The probability of Hi can be written as
Pr [Hi] =
(
n
i
)(
k + i− 1
z
)i
Pr [Fn−i,k+i < z] .
Since Hi’s are mutually exclusive and the event Fn,k ≥ z is the union of Hi for i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
we get
Pr [Fn,k ≥ z] =
∑
i
Pr [Hi] =
∑
i
(
n
i
)(
k + i− 1
z
)i
Pr [Fn−i,k+i < z] . (15)
This gives a recursive relation for Pr[Fn,k ≥ z] and the boundary condition is Pr[F0,k ≥ z] = 0.
We shall prove that
Pr [Fn,k ≥ z] = 1−
(z − n− k + 1)(z + 1− k)n−1
zn
.
We verify this by induction. The base case n = 0 can be verified directly. Further, by (15) and by
introduction hypothesis, we have
Pr [Fn,k ≥ z] =
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)(
k + i− 1
z
)i (
1−Pr [Fn−i,k+i < z]
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)(
k + i− 1
z
)i (z − n− k + 1)(z + 1− k − i)n−i−1
zn−i
=
(z − n− k + 1)
zn
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
(k + i− 1)i(z + 1− k − i)n−i−1
By a version of Abel’s Identity [13], we have
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(k + i− 1)i(z + 1− k − i)n−i−1 =
zn
z − n− k + 1
.
20
Substituting this back, we get
Pr [Fn,k ≥ z] =
(z − n− k + 1)
zn
(
zn
z − n− k + 1
− (z + 1− k)n−1
)
= 1−
(z − n− k + 1)(z + 1− k)n−1
zn
.
This completes the proof of the inductive step.
Therefore, we have
Pr [maxV(B) ≥ z] = Pr [Fn,0 ≥ z] = 1−
(z − n+ 1)(z + 1)n−1
zn
.
Now we can get the expectation by the following calculation.
E [maxV(B)] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr [maxV(B) ≥ z] dz
= n− 1 +
∫ ∞
n−1
(
1−
(z − n+ 1)(z + 1)n−1
zn
)
dz
= n− 1 +
∫ ∞
n−1
∑n−2
i=0
(
n
i
)
(n− i− 1)zi
zn
dz
= n− 1 +
n−2∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(n− i− 1)
∫ ∞
n−1
1
zn−i
dz
= n− 1 +
n−2∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(n− i− 1)
1
(n − i− 1)(n − 1)n−i−1
= n− 1 +
1
(n− 1)n−1
(
nn − (n− 1)n − n(n− 1)n−1
)
= n
(
n
n− 1
)n−1
− n.
Thus, we get a lower bound on the competitive ratio for maxV(·)
γn ,
E[maxV(B)]
n
=
(
n
n− 1
)n−1
− 1,
where the denominator is n, as the expected revenue of any auction is at most n on the equal
revenue distribution. Finally, we note that γn approaches e− 1 as n goes to infinity.
On the other hand, we can show that maxV(·) is γn-attainable by our characterization theorem.
The proof is almost identically to our argument for F (2) in the previous section. We only replace
λn by γn, F
(2)(·) by maxV(·), and Hn(z) = max
(
0, n+1−Fn(z)
)
by Hn(z) = max
(
0, n−Fn(z)
)
.
In the argument for F (2), we do not use any explicit formula for F (2), but employ a few properties
such as monotonicity, symmetry, linearity, and the fact that the function value does not change if
one increases the largest bid. These properties continue to hold for the benchmark maxV(·). The
definition of Hn(z) = max
(
0, n + 1 − Fn(z)
)
is the only place where we use the formula for F (2),
which is replaced by Hn(z) = max
(
0, n−Fn(z)
)
for maxV(·). Note that the properties that we use
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are that Hn(z) is decreasing and does not change if one increases the largest bid, which continue
to hold for the modified Hn(z). Therefore, the whole proof of the attainability of F
(2) carries over
to the benchmark maxV(·).
We summarize our results in the following theorem.
Theorem 16. For the benchmark maxV(·) and any n ≥ 2, the optimal competitive ratio of a
truthful auction is γn =
(
n
n−1
)n−1
− 1.
7 Concluding Remarks
Our paper studies designing optimal competitive digital goods auctions. The proof of the character-
ization theorem gives an explicit procedure that constructs an auction with the optimal competitive
ratio. The construction, however, is rather abstract and may take exponential steps for some bench-
marks. It is therefore an intriguing question to see if there is any simple form for the description
of optimal auctions (with respect to, e.g., the F (2) benchmark).
We remark that our characterization applies not only to symmetric benchmarks such as F (2)
but also non-symmetric benchmarks. In particular, Theorem 3 may better estimate the competitive
ratio of the monotone-price benchmark M(2) of Leonardi and Roughgarden [26].
All our discussions in this paper are only for the unlimited supply case. However, our results
to some extent carry over to the limited supply setting. In a limited supply setting, let k be the
number of units for sale and n > k be the number of bidders. Let f : Rn → R be any non-
negative and monotone benchmark. We define f1(b1, . . . , bk) = f(b1, . . . , bk−1, bk, bk, . . . , bk) and
f2(b1, . . . , bk) = f(b1, . . . , bk−1, bk, 0, . . . , 0), for each b = (b1, . . . , bn) with b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bn.
That is, we ‘increase’ and ‘decrease’ in f(·) the last n − k bids to bk and 0, respectively. We have
f1(b1, . . . , bn) ≥ f(b1, . . . , bn) ≥ f2(b1, . . . , bn) for any b due to the monotonicity condition. We note
that f1(·) and f2(·) only depend on the highest k bids and may be viewed as two other benchmarks.
Now we may find the optimal competitive ratios of unlimited supply auctions with k bidders for
both benchmarks f1(·) and f2(·) with the help of Theorem 3. We note that the competitive ratios
for the f1(·) and f2(·) benchmarks give upper and lower bounds, respectively, on the competitive
ratio of k-unit auctions with respect to the benchmark f(·). Indeed, we may construct the following
limited supply auction: given a vector of bids b = (b1, . . . , bn) with b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bn, we admit
only the k highest bids and then run the optimal competitive auction with respect to the f1(·)
benchmark. We note that the revenue of such an auction can only be higher than the respective
revenue of the unlimited supply auction for f1(·).
We observe that if f(·) only depends on the k highest bids, then f(·) = f1(·) = f2(·) and their
respective competitive ratios are the same. This is the case for the benchmark F (2,k), considered
previously in [14, 19] and defined as the optimal omniscient fixed price auction that sells between
2 and k items. Therefore, without much work we obtain optimal competitive k-unit auctions
with respect to the benchmark f(·). We note that for other benchmark functions, the question of
designing optimal competitive k-unit auctions remains open; we leave this interesting question for
the future work.
Finally, we remark that the type of questions that we have addressed in Theorem 3 (namely,
what are the worst-case distributions of the input for analysing competitive ratios of various bench-
marks) is fundamental to our understanding and discovery of the optimal competitive ratios. We
believe that this question should be added to the agenda of the areas in Theoretical Computer
Science that use competitive analysis such as online algorithms and algorithmic mechanism design.
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